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Towards a New Paradigm in Justifying
Copyright: An UniversalisticTranscendental Approach
Christian G. Stallberg∗
In the modern digital age, copyright as an institution can no
longer be taken for granted. These days piracy of songs, movies,
software and the like is hardly morally contested. Indeed, it is not
far-fetched to argue that piracy has become socially acceptable.
But efforts to sanction such behavior are bound to fail. Laws that a
large majority views as untenable and refuses to comply with
become normatively senseless. For the acceptance of, and the
compliance with, legal norms ultimately rests upon extralegal
foundations, namely on the belief that these norms on the whole
are morally reasonable. Accordingly, only the development of a
solid moral basis for copyright can strengthen its social acceptance,
thereby warranting copyright’s future existence. The arguments
that have been offered do not provide such a basis. Above all, they
lack of sufficiently argumentative structures and a systematic
framework from which a sound moral justification can emanate.
The result is an increasing gap between a diminishing moral basis
of and a growing disagreement over copyright.
This Article attempts to provide a more systematic and rational
basis for the moral justification of copyright. First, the article
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offers an analytical account of conceivable justification models.
Rather than simply restating popular arguments, the author focuses
on the implicit assumptions underlying these moral arguments.
After elaborating two basic models of copyright justification, each
of which can be subdivided into three subtypes, the article
demonstrates that these models inevitably result in an
irreconcilable divide between authors and society. Secondly, the
article therefore develops an alternative justification model that
avoids this conflict. This model stems from the idea that the onedimensional ground upon which usual arguments stand can be left
by returning to the transcendental condition of their possibility,
that is, human language. Consequently, the article explains how
intellectual works can be understood from the perspective of
speech act theory. On this view, intellectual works can be
conceived of as complex speech acts. The author elucidates how
both a right of attribution of authorship as well as exploitation
rights can be morally rooted in this finding. The article concludes
by highlighting the ontological and moral paradigm shift that
occurs when the moral justification of copyright is conceived of in
terms of communicative actions and their implied rules.
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright law, perhaps more than any other field of law, is
subject to permanent struggle between opposing camps, each one
arguing for and against legal reforms and changes in their own
favor. Admittedly, it may well be that this situation is simply
rooted in the economic importance of copyright law. Even
marginal reforms of copyright law can affect producers,
distributors, consumers, authors, and retailers in ways that
significantly increase or decrease their expenses or revenues. If
one takes these economic reasons into account, the struggle for
copyright law is unremarkable. On the contrary, being a homo
oeconomicus naturally necessitates a participation in that struggle.
However, that is only half of the story and does not reveal a much
more interesting feature worth highlighting. It can be found in
certain flaws embedded in the moral discourse on copyright itself.
That is to say, many of the justificatory arguments being offered in
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order to defend as well as criticize copyright lack clarity and an
argumentative structure. This is illustrated best by the popular
strategy to employ personality and labor arguments in order to
justify copyright.1 Those arguments are fully content with using
rhetorical phrases and metaphors that merely aim at self-evident
plausibility.2 That comes along with, and might be partly due to,
an absence of coherent policy considerations held by the
responsible legislative bodies. Hardly surprisingly, such an
uncritical environment invites participants primarily to define their
interests, and only secondarily to look for arguments deserving
their name.
Hence, the intensity of the debate is not reflected in the quality
of the arguments being made. Still worse, there is an obvious gap
between the ease with which those unconvincing arguments are
steadily repeated and the growing disagreement over copyright
law. In the absence of defined structures and an argumentative
framework, one cannot expect to find a solid normative basis for
copyright. Such a basis is required in order to maintain the
fundamental aspects of copyright law. For it is certain that
copyright is not socially accepted in the same way other legal
institutions are, e.g., private property in tangible goods.3 On the
contrary, these days piracy of songs, movies, software and the like
is hardly morally contested. In the modern digital age, copyright
as an institution can no longer be taken for granted.4 Indeed, it is
not far-fetched to argue that piracy has become a socially accepted

1

See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 285 (1970);
Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1230
(1996).
2
This is also emphasized in Katie Sykes, Towards a Public Justification of Copyright,
61 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2003).
3
See Jeanne M. Logsdon et al., Software Piracy: Is It Related to Level of Moral
Judgement?, 13 J. BUS. ETHICS 849, 855 (1994), for an empirical study showing that the
development described is not bound to a low stage of moral development in the sense of
Kohlberg—“the implications of our study are serious, since even those who are capable
of the most principled moral reasoning may engage in copying behavior.” Id. (emphasis
added).
4
The view that natural rights inherently accompany “intellectual production,”
however, has long been held; for an early example see William E. Simonds, Natural
Right of Property in Intellectual Production, 1 YALE L.J. 16, 16 (1891–1892).
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activity, and efforts to sanction such behavior are doomed to fail.
Laws that a large majority view as unacceptable and refuse to
comply with ultimately become normatively senseless. The
acceptance of, and the compliance with, legal norms ultimately
rests upon extralegal foundations, namely the belief that a certain
norm complex on the whole is morally reasonable. Obviously, this
belief has been diminishing with regard to copyright law. But
why? The answer lies ultimately in serious problems of the
legitimacy of copyright. These legitimacy problems can be
subdivided into two categories, ontological and technological.
Ontological problems stem from the ontology of intellectual
works.5 Since these objects are not tangible but solely exist as
intellectual constructs, it is much easier to criticize their legal
status. At least three such moral weaknesses of copyright attached
to this ontology can be identified.6 The first may be called the
problem of ubiquity. Because of their intangible status, intellectual
works can be used simultaneously in multiple ways. The content
of a book, for example, can easily be read, told, copied, and so
forth by an unlimited number of people. The question therefore
arises as to why other people should be legally prevented from
using a naturally unlimited good because of an artificial scarcity
created by copyright law?7 Relatedly, there is a problem of greater
restriction of individual liberty.8 Unlike property rights in

5

For further elucidation of the ontology of intellectual works see infra Part III.A.
Contrary to what A. M. Honoré, Social Justice, 8 MCGILL L.J. 77, 88 (1962) says,
there is therefore a moral difference between intangible and tangible objects. Also, it is
equally misleading to suppose that the justification of copyright law is easier. See, e.g.,
Ernest Bruncken, The Philosophy of Copyright, 1916 THE MUSICAL Q. 477, 479 (1916)
(stating the mistaken view that “[i]f . . . a man is, by the very nature of justice, entitled to
have dominion over the product of either his hand or his brain, we must certainly admit
that artists should have their copyright.”); see also Herbert Spencer, 2 THE PRINCIPLES OF
ETHICS para. 305 (1893), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/files/334/
spencer_0155.02.pdf (“So that in fact a production of mental labor may be regarded as
property in a fuller sense that may a product of bodily labor; since that which constitutes
its value is exclusively created by the worker.”) (emphasis added).
7
See, e.g., Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
31, 34–35 (1989).
8
See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 211(Dartmouth
1996); Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of
Property Rights and Ideal Objects, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
6
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tangibles, copyright law restricts the individual liberty of people
other than the copyright owner not only at a certain place, but also
at every place. This is logically the other side of ubiquity: if
intellectual works can be used everywhere, then the exclusive
protection of those works restricts people everywhere. Finally, a
problem concerning the notion of authorship arises. Today it is a
common occurrence that intellectual works never originate
exclusively from the person authorship is attributed to. Instead,
every author is integrated into the manifold social and cultural
contexts from which he steadily borrows.
Thus, creating
intellectual works always means the appropriation of preceding
ideas. This point has been emphasized by the deconstructivism
movement which focuses on deconstructing authorship and
disclosing its ideological character.9 A similar view can be also
found in the argument of private language advanced by
Wittgenstein.10
The legitimacy of copyright is also called into question by
technological developments11 which have increased the awareness
of the aforementioned ontological problems. Indeed, the very
historical reason for the emergence of copyright has begun turning
against the institution. In the same way the need for copyright was
due to the invention of printing, nowadays its legitimacy is called

PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 43, 54–55, 76–79 (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews
eds., 2002).
9
See, e.g., Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY,
PRACTICE 113 (Donald F. Bouchard ed., 1977); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and
Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413,
1418–19 (1992); Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked
Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 929–32 (1999); see generally Lionel Bently,
Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature and Law, 57 MOD. L. REV. 973
(1994) (providing an overview); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in
Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063 (2002–2003) (analyzing of the
legal concepts of authorship).
10
See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS para. 243–44 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., Blackwell Pub. Ltd. 2d ed. 1958); see also Julian Friedland, Ideation
and Appropriation: Wittgenstein on Intellectual Property, 12 LAW & CRITIQUE 185, 187
(2001).
11
See also Sykes, supra note 2, at 10–11 (discussing these problems—though with a
different terminology).
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into question by different inventions.12 In particular, technological
innovation has resulted in an increased quality and quantity in
copying intellectual works. The greater quality of copies is an
effect of progressing digitalization. In the digital world, every
copy is not merely as perfect as the original; it even might be
better.13 Between 0 and 1 as the binary code of the digital world,
there is no longer space for what Benjamin once called the aura of
art works.14 In the digital age, the concept of uniqueness no longer
has any relevance. In addition, copying can be done in greater
quantity than ever before. The main reason for this can be found in
the emergence of the Internet which enables an incredible
dissemination of intellectual works. For every copyright owner the
Internet seems to be a nightmare—it is a place “where the ability to
copy could not be better, and where the protection of law could not
be worse.”15 This does not mean that copyright cannot be enforced
on the Internet. Lessig has stressed that the Internet actually could
be used in a manner allowing much more control over
copyrights.16 As long as this does not happen, however, the threat
is still there.
Considering all of the above, the moral situation of copyright
could hardly be worse. In what follows, I shall provide some steps
towards solving this situation. I will generally attempt to reduce,
or even partly eliminate, the lack of rationality in the discourse
concerning the moral justification of copyright. This enterprise
consists of two parts. First, I shall develop in Part II an
argumentative and conceptual framework within which both
proponents and opponents of copyright can articulate their moral
arguments with more lucidity and precision. This framework
builds upon a differentiation and ideal reconstruction of
12

See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 21–24 (2003).
13
See NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 17–18 (1995) (“[A]rtifacts can be
removed from the digital signal using a few extra bits and increasingly sophisticated
error-correction techniques that are applied to one form of noise or another, in one
medium or another.”).
14
See Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction 3–4
(1935), available at http://design.wishiewashie.com/HT5/WalterBenjaminTheWorkof
Art.pdf.
15
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 125 (1999).
16
See id. at 123.
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conceivable models for justifying copyright. Unlike in other
articles,17 the account given herein will not simply rest upon a
casuistry of arguments. Instead, I will attempt to establish
analytical distinctions between these arguments, through which
logical relations and dependencies can be revealed. This program
might be designated as a moral conceptualization of copyright
from the viewpoint of analytic philosophy. Secondly, in Part III, I
will outline an alternative model whereby the moral justification of
copyright might be articulated in a different, more contemporary
way. By utilizing linguistic philosophy, my model focuses on the
communicative feature of intellectual works. This way overcomes
problems and shortcomings of the other models.
II. DIFFERENT MODELS OF JUSTIFYING COPYRIGHT
In what follows I will develop or, more precisely, ideally
reconstruct, different models for justifying copyright.18 For this
17
See, e.g., DRAHOS, supra note 8; William W. Fisher, Theories of Intellectual
Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 173
(Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories,
in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 129 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De
Geest eds., 2000); William W. Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV.
L. REV 1661, 1695 (1988); Hettinger, supra note 7, at 31; Justin Hughes, The Philosophy
of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, In Search
of the Story: Narratives of Intellectual Property, 10 VA. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2005); H.M.
Spector, An Outline of a Theory Justifying Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights, 8
EIPR 270 (1989); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1197 (1996); Samuel E. Trosow, The Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories:
Copyright, Commodification and Capital, 16 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 217, 223 (2003); Lior
Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, I. P. Q., 2006, at 55.
18
These models necessarily presuppose (i) a concept of moral justification and (ii) an
idea of how copyright may be its subject. These issues cannot be addressed here in
detail. For reasons I have stated elsewhere, see CHRISTIAN GERO STALLBERG,
URHEBERRECHT UND MORALISCHE RECHTFERTIGUNG 34–46 (Duncker & Humblot 2006),
the former necessitates copyright’s positive correspondence to a moral norm; this
correspondence might differ in level and scope. As to its level, it can either concern
copyright as an institution or as a specific content. Its scope depends upon the deontic
modus of the moral norm it corresponds to. Thus, copyright is morally possible if it
corresponds to a norm allowing the legislator its introduction. In contrast, it is morally
necessary if the norm requires the legislator to introduce it. From an adequate metaethical and methodological viewpoint, those aspects concern the legislative actions whose
interpretative meaning is that norm or norm system establishing an exclusive legal
relation between authors and certain intellectual works, i.e., what we term “copyright.”
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purpose, it is useful to separate two distinct levels of analysis.
These analytical levels enable one to structure both current and
prospective discourses on the moral justification of copyright.
Those levels provide crucial distinctions with which possible
arguments can be both constructed and related to each other. At a
first level of analysis (Section A), it will be shown that all such
models are based on a fundamental distinction, though they are
often unaware of it. This distinction results from the way in which
all conceivable models of justification are connected or separated.
This difference is not only of heuristic value; it has substantial
implications for the type of copyright system that can be
justified.19 Furthermore, this distinction has an additional impact
that is of even more importance. By analyzing the distinct
relations it separates, this distinction enables, at a second level of
analysis, to develop a typology of justification models as to
copyright. This typology comprises three justification models
which I call individualistic (Section B) and three justification
models which I refer to as collectivistic (Section C). Having
sketched the basic ideas of those models, I will subsequently
present the general difficulties all of those models face (Section
D).
A. The Difference Between Individualistic and Collectivistic
Copyright Models
How might arguments justifying copyright be systematically
ordered? In the field of normative ethics, actions are usually
evaluated in relation to two different aspects.20 On the one hand,
the action as such, i.e., the intentions, reasons and motives of a
human action, are focused on. Accordingly, the intrinsic character
of an action is involved in its ethical judgment. A classical
example of this doctrine is the moral theory of Kant. His theory
contends that the moral quality of an action depends solely upon
the will of the agent.21 On the other hand, an action might be also
19

These consequences are mentioned infra note 35.
See, e.g., WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 13 (1963); Hugh LaFolette, Introduction,
in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO ETHICAL THEORY 1, 6–11 (Hugh LaFolette ed., 2000).
21
For the classical statement, see IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 18 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998)
20
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morally evaluated by the social results it causes. Hence, the
extrinsic character of an action becomes the basis for its moral
assessment. This perspective is reflected in the doctrine of
utilitarianism, according to which the morality of an action
depends upon the overall happiness it produces.22 This conceptual
distinction shows up under different labels; it is, inter alia, referred
to
as
deontological/teleological,
non-consequentialism/
consequentialism or non-utilitarian/utilitarian. Not only does this
distinction dominate moral philosophy; most of the moral
justifications of copyright and intellectual property in general
utilize it. But seldom is it expressed by its common labels.23
Rather, there is a confusing diversity of names which cannot be
seen as a progress, neither in subject, nor in terminology. It is
expressed, for example, in notions like “The Author’s Right” and
“The Instrumental Argument,”24 as well as “instrumental
An alternative
justification” and “desert justification.”25
terminology, which transports a mistaken conceptual view as well,
distinguishes between economic and moral/natural lawarguments.26 These arguments overlook that economy and
morality do not mark an inevitable opposition, but, depending on

(“It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that
could be considered good without limitation except a good will.”) (emphasis added).
22
Classical formulations can be found in JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 11–16 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 1996); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 411–17 (7th ed. 1907)
(1874).
23
However, those common labels are used by Menell, supra note 17, at 129; Dale
Nance, Foreword: Owning Ideas, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 763 (1990); Spector,
supra note 17, at 270.
24
Lloyd Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149,
1217, 1229 (1998).
25
Sterk, supra note 17, at 1197.
26
Such an approach can be found in Breyer, supra note 1, at 284; Jon Garon,
Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy and Ethics, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1285 (2003); Alfred Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright
as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 517 (1990); see also Shelley Warwick, Is
Copyright Ethical? An Examination of the Theories, Laws and Practices Regarding the
Private Ownership of Intellectual Work in the United States, BOSTON COLL. INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. F. 060505, 3 (1999); Daniel Stengel, Intellectual Property in Philosophy,
90 ARSP 20, 22 (2004).
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the theoretical standpoint, can converge.27 By the same token,
natural law and morals are not necessarily identical; instead, as
contemporary theories show, morality can have a basis quite
different from classical natural law doctrine.28
To be sure, moral thinking in deontological and teleological
categories is a simple and, at the same time, an intuitive method of
evaluating human actions. For the present purposes, however, we
need a more specific distinction, that is, a distinction able to
capture the ultimate difference between opposing justification
models for copyright.29 Contrary to what the common distinction
between deontological/teleological or consequentialistic/nonconsequentialistic models might suggest, the difference between
the arguments justifying copyright does not lie in an intrinsic or
extrinsic value of copyright. Even though such considerations
have their own right and are of some importance, they obscure the
fact that, in the context of copyright, what matters is within which
relation these considerations take place.30 For copyright’s intrinsic
or extrinsic value ultimately hinges upon the particular relations
from which it can be argumentatively derived. These relations
center around the subject matter of copyright protection, namely,
intellectual works. In other words, to whom do intellectual works

27

This position is often held by those adhering to the Economic Analysis of Law. See,
e.g., Richard Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 487 (1980); for a more pragmatic reasoning,
see, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 374 (1990); see also
Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119
(1979).
28
Recent examples are Hobbesian interest theories of justice, Habermasian discourse
ethics and Rawlsian justice as fairness.
29
That applies similarly for the conceptual distinction proprietarianism/
instrumentalism, introduced by DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 199. Admittedly, he puts aside
pure considerations in intrinsical/extrinsical categories; by the same token, however, he
does not give way for a pure thinking in relations. Instead, his distinction confines
itself—since its rests upon contrasting Locke and utilitarianism—to separate natural law
from legal privilege. Yet it is rather interesting whose natural law or legal privilege it is
about.
30
The same applies to the distinction between multilateral and bilateral public
justification as utilized by Sykes, supra note 2, at 21. This distinction misses the specific
point when used in copyright contexts because it conceals the reason why these
justifications are reasonable, i.e., the moral relation that tacitly is presupposed.
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morally relate? Thinking in relations replaces thinking in
intrinsic/extrinsic values.
In order to illuminate this concept, it is necessary to introduce
the concept of primary and secondary relations.31 The primary
relation refers to the moral relation which provides the arguments
by means of which copyright is justified. The legal relation, that is
copyright, which exists between an author and an intellectual
work, is morally derived from the primary relation and therefore
termed a secondary relation.32 Both relations are logically
independent from one another and, therefore, are not necessarily
identical. From this it follows that copyright, in the legal sense, is
not necessarily the author’s right in the moral sense. In the light of
this basic difference, it is crucial to determine from which moral
relation (primary relation) arguments are derived in order to justify
the legal relation between the author and his work (secondary
relation). Such primary relation can be morally constructed either
between the author and his work, or between society and the
work.33 As a result, copyright can be justified by arguments
stemming from a moral relation between either author and work or
society and work.34 Insofar as the first relation is chosen, I shall
refer to an individualistic model of moral justification. That is to
say, the arguments by means of which copyright is justified are
found and constructed within a primary author/work relation. If
the second relation is chosen and the society/work relation serves

31

These two different relations are somewhat confused in Carys Craig, Locke, Labour
and Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning Against a Lockean Approach to Copyright
Law, 28 QUEENS’S L.J. 1, 6 (2002) (suggesting that the copyright interest must be
understood as the consequence of the relationship between the public and the work).
32
See id. at 1 (creating a distinction between the legal relation between author and
work and a different moral relation whereby it is justified).
33
Other relations, though equally conceivable, do not have any importance here. (i)
The author/society relation cannot be integrated, since that relation only reflects the
relation in which the duties and obligations exist, not their reasons. If the author has a
moral right springing from his relation to his work, then he has such a right against
society. (ii) By the same token, the work/world relation is of no argumentative
significance. Since “world” in this context inevitably refers to the intellectual world, it is
the equivalent of society because that is the place where meaning and communication is
generated.
34
This framework is also employed by Craig, supra note 31, at 3–5, though with other
terminology (“author-work link”/“public-work link”).
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as the primary relation, I shall refer to a collectivistic model of
moral justification.35
The distinction between individualistic and collectivistic
approaches must be clarified in two ways in order to avoid any
misunderstanding. First, the implied antagonism does not mean
that collectivistic models ignore or underestimate the value of
individuals. Quite the contrary; social structures are usually
desired because of their benefits for every individual. This is the
case, for instance, with claims that copyright is morally justified by
the economic principle of efficiency. Such an argument is by no
means individualistic. In moral terms, here the author only counts
as an abstract individual, not as a specific being, namely an author.
The author is integrated in a collectivistic justification just as any
other member of society would be. So the difference between
individualistic and collectivistic models cannot be found in the
exclusion or inclusion of individuals; it can only be found in the
way in which individuals are morally included, that is, solely as
authors, or other parts of society as well.
A second aspect needs to be clarified. I am not claiming that
any argument can be definitely recognized as individualistic or
collectivistic. To be sure, in many cases it is hard to recognize
whether a moral argument about copyright has an individualistic or
collectivistic basis. This is so because such arguments often rely
upon rhetorical phrases without being aware of their theoretical
basis. The popular argument, for instance, that the author deserves
his work as reward for his labor, is susceptible to either an
individualistic or collectivistic interpretation. On the one hand, it
35

The difference between individualistic and collectivistic models is not merely of
heuristic importance, it concerns the justifiable content of copyright as well. An
argument based upon an individualistic model cannot justify the post mortal subsistence
of copyright. This can only be justified if a collectivistic model is employed. This thesis
rests upon two convincing assumptions: (i) Any argument claiming that human beings
have mental states after their death, namely interests, is not accepted as a starting point of
a contemporary rational justification; and (ii) Any individualistic model, however, leads
to a post mortal copyright only if (i) is presupposed. Unless leaving any rational
discourse, therefore, one can only use a collectivistic model as rational foundation for
post mortal copyright. Since law serves interests of human beings, without a subject to
be protected, there is nothing left for legal protection. So if after the death of an author
copyright is granted, it serves other interests than the author’s. For an elaboration of this
argument at full length, see STALLBERG, supra note 18, 50–52.
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is conceivable that such a reward acknowledges an initial moral
stake of the author in his work. In such a case, the moral
justification stems from the author/work relation. On the other
hand, that reward might be socially motivated by attempting to
provide an incentive for creating works. Then, reasons are
involved concerning the society/work relation. What kind of
justification is being put forward—that is, which relation is the
“primarily” primary relation—depends upon the ultimate reasoning
behind it. That reasoning does not appear in the rhetorical form or
its perception. Instead, the reasons upon which a justification of
copyright ultimately is built show up in the case of conflict.
Where an individualistic justification interferes with a collectivistic
justification—e.g., if the protected works are socially invaluable—
its user must make a decision. It is not before this decision that the
priority of one of those perspectives and the moral reasoning of the
argument is revealed.
B. Three Types of Individualistic Justification Models
Individualistic justification models represent arguments which
claim a moral relation between author and work as a primary
relation, by virtue of which a legal relation between author and
work is justified as a secondary relation. It is possible to show that
individualistic models exhaustively appear in three different forms.
These forms and their structures can be made explicit by an
analysis of the primary relation between the author and the work.
The intellectual starting point for this analytical operation is as
follows: every individualistic justification—that is because it is
individualistic!—always focuses on a characteristic quality within
the author/work relation in order to construct an argument in favor
of the author.
Consequently, there are exactly as many
individualistic justifications as characteristic qualities within that
primary relation. It needs to be analyzed, therefore, what and how
many characteristic qualities the primary relation author/work
embodies.
At the highest level of abstraction, the author/work relation
embodies three characteristic qualities: (i) With regard to the
author, it can be focused, first, on his properties, dependencies,
intentions and so forth. Then, one draws upon internal or external
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characteristics which hinge upon the author as person—hence, the
characteristic quality to be focused on is a person. (ii) Second, it
can be argued based on a mental or bodily activity of the author,
for instance, when pointing toward his investment of labor in the
work. As a result an action of the author is chosen as the
characteristic quality. (iii) Regarding the work, third, the aspect of
activity or action does not exist. Instead, only perceivable aspects
of the work itself can be used as arguments. From an analytical
point of view, therefore, three characteristic qualities to be
argumentatively drawn upon exist within the author/work relation.
These are the action, the person and the work of the author.
Taking these preliminaries into account, three ways of justifying
copyright can be distinguished, an Action-based, a Personalitybased and a Work-based Justification. Each of those types and its
theoretical forms will be briefly sketched.36
1. The Action-based Justification of Copyright
The Action-based justification generally claims that the action
performed by an author while creating an intellectual work vests
the author with a right in that work. This justification can be made
in two distinct ways, differing in how the author’s action involved
is argumentatively used.37 On the one hand, the action might be
conceived of as having a right-transferring effect. In this case it
operates as a kind of intermediary between a preceding right of the
author and the right to be established in the created work. Such an
impact stems from a derivative use of the creative action. As long
as this route is taken, one has to contend that the author’s action
possesses a formal property which enables it to extend the
preexisting right to the created work. On the other hand, the
author’s creative action might be interpreted and conceived of as
right-constituting. Then it no longer extends a preceding right to
the intellectual work but establishes such a right ab initio. This
line of argument is an original use of the creative action; it
36

For an analysis and discussion in detail see id. at 57–58.
On this analysis see further Christian Gero Stallberg, Ist das Urheberrecht das
moralische Recht des Urhebers? Eine Kritik der populären Arbeits- und
Persönlichkeitsrhetoriken als Rechtfertigungsbasis des Urheberrechts, ARCHIV FÜR
URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT, Jan. 2007, at 109–12.
37
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presupposes that the author’s action possesses a material quality of
moral relevance. On an abstract level, therefore, two types of
arguments can be distinguished with which an Action-based
justification might operate, a derivative-formal and an originalmaterial one. The former is by far the most popular line of
argument in copyright discourse.38 It is widely used and illustrated
by referring to the so-called labor theory of property as developed
by John Locke39 with whose entire theory it is often mistakenly
equated.40 The latter approach is less frequently employed though
it remains rhetorically a powerful one as well.41 However, it
requires an elaborated account of a desert theory of justice which is
rarely provided.
2. The Personality-based Justification of Copyright
A Personality-based justification presupposes a relationship of
dependence between the authors’ personality and their intellectual
works. This relationship is legally protected and recognized by
copyright.42 Depending on how and what kind of dependence is
38

For the Lockean approach—applied to copyright or intellectual property in general or
to particular problems—see generally Craig, supra note 31; Benjamin G. Damstedt,
Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J.
1179 (2003); Steven J. Horowitz, Rethinking Lockean Copyright and Fair Use, 10
DEAKIN L. REV. 209 (2005); Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View of the
Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 3 (2003); Adam D.
Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65 (1997);
Simonds, supra note 4; Spector, supra note 17; Lior Zemer, The Making of a New
Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 891 (2005–2006).
39
See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT §§ 25–51 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1689).
40
This is so because Locke’s theory consists of four different arguments which
concern, on the one hand, the justification of private property as such and, on the other
hand, the modalities of its acquisition. The Lockean argument representing the
derivative-formal type merely addresses one of those aspects, namely how private
property can be acquired. Consequently, labeling this argument as Lockean justification
is somewhat inaccurate. For only a small portion of Locke’s theory is used whose
normative subject matter is fairly extended.
41
See generally Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.KENT L. REV. 609 (1993); Hughes, supra note 17, at 300.
42
It has to be emphasized, therefore, that the metaphorical image of an imprint of the
author’s personality upon his work is argumentatively not a Personality-based, but an
Action-based Justification. For in this popular account, the author’s personality does play
a role only insofar as it has been integrated into the work. By invoking the powerful idea
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constructed, two types of Personality-based justifications have to
be distinguished. The development-theoretical type assumes that
copyright is necessary in order to warrant the author’s
development as a person. By considering personhood as a
necessary condition of human autonomy, this type leads—given
the premise of a moral right to freedom—to the conclusion that
granting copyright to authors is morally necessary. In contrast, the
identification-theoretical type starts with the assumption that
creating a work results in a psychological relation between the
author and the work. In other words, the intellectual work is part
of the author’s personality and should be considered an integral
part of his own identity. In order to prevent harmful interferences
with the author’s identity or to avoid the creation of psychological
pathologies, this relation needs to be protected by legal means, i.e.,
by copyright. Thus it can be seen that both types, though in
different ways, are based on the same normative tenet, namely the
freedom of individuals. Whereas the former strand of argument
plainly relies upon a metaphysical conception of person, the latter
is of more empirical character. The development-theoretical type
is usually derived from and associated with Hegel’s theory of
property as developed in his Philosophy of Right.43
The
identification-theoretical type has no well-established theoretical
background which may be the reason why it is rarely put
forward.44

of a right-transferring activity, therefore, the derivative-formal mode of an Action-based
justification is employed.
43
See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT paras. 41–71 (T.M.
Knox trans, Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1821).
44
Discussion of this model can be found solely in Becker, supra note 41, at 626–28
(classifying this idea, strangely, as labor-based justification by desert); see also
LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 49 (Routledge and
Kegan Paul 1977). The mentioned psychological relation is loosely indicated in Linda J.
Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1539, 1541–42; Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author
Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 400–02 (1993); Sterk, supra
note 17, 1239–44. As general justification of property the idea is suggested by Margaret
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959–61 (1982).
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3. The Work-based Justification of Copyright
The Work-based justification also assumes a certain kind of
dependency between authors and their intellectual works. Yet this
relationship differs in two respects from the Personality-based
justification. First, it no longer stems from a metaphysical or
psychological ground but from the specific ontology of intellectual
works, namely their immaterial nature. Secondly, the intellectual
work depends upon the author, rather than the author being
dependent on the work. So copyright is seen as a moral
consequence of this dependency. This sort of dependency might
be construed in at least two distinct ways. The communicativetheoretical type emphasizes the communicative aspect of
intellectual works. It starts with the premise that authors
communicate their thoughts to the public through intellectual
works. It further supposes that the content of an intellectual work
can only be communicated authentically if the attribution to its
author remains intact.
Put differently: the intellectual
appropriation of a work is possible solely with hermeneutical
recourse to its author. Therefore, a legal regulation is needed to
protect this functional condition of communication and to avoid a
violation of the authors’ communicative freedom. The idea
underlying this argumentation can be traced back to Kant’s theory
of authorship where it finds its most prominent manifestation.45
The exclusive-theoretical type takes a different route by
constructing a dependency based not on a condition but on a limit
of intellectual appropriation.
According to this view, an
intellectual work is by its very nature exclusive: it necessarily
precludes people other than the author from its entire
appropriation. It is merely the author’s mind which has access to
the full intellectual meaning of the work, i.e., its specific form of
thought. Copyright, then, is simply a normative recognition of
what already exists, namely the exclusive relationship between the
author and his work. Such a justification can be derived from

45

Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books, in
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 29, 29–35 (Mary J. Gregor trans., 1996) (1785); see also
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 106 (Mary J. Gregor trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1991) (1797).
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thoughts developed by Fichte on the wrongfulness of book
reprinting.46
C. Three Types of Collectivistic Justification Models
Unlike individualistic models, collectivistic models47 do not
claim a moral relation between author and work. Instead, these
models construct a moral relation between society and work. This
primary relation serves as a moral basis on which a legal relation
between author and work is justified as a secondary relation. By
utilizing collectivistic justifications, the separation of the legal
right from its moral basis—suggested by introducing the
distinction between primary/secondary relations—is not merely
analytically but also argumentatively maintained. That is to say,
the legal and moral congruency strongly emphasized by the
individualistic justification models is rejected. Copyright as legal
right of the author is no longer conceptualized as his moral right
but as a means to accomplish social goals. Each collectivistic
model refers to a social goal that is considered desirable, whose
development, stabilization, or achievement is allegedly being
promoted by copyright. As a result, collectivistic models normally
show up in the form of consequentialism, i.e., they take into
consideration the social consequences of copyright.48 They differ
only in what goal they regard as socially desirable. As a result,
every collectivistic justification inevitably relies upon a certain
normative conception of society. Since such conceptions are
theoretically limitless, providing an analytical typology of
collectivistic justifications is difficult. Nevertheless, their diversity
can be put in order. All collectivistic models structurally differ in

46

See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Beweis der Unrechtmässigkeit des Büchernachdrucks, in
I GESAMTAUSGABE DER BAYERISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN 409 (Rüdiger
Lauth ed., 1964).
47
In the literature, several distinct terms can be found describing the same doctrine.
See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 2, at 23 (“social policy arguments”).
48
For that reason, collectivistic justifications are often termed “utilitarian.” In so
doing, however, the concept of utilitarianism is by far exceeded. For it is used then to
generally describe a program according to which the moral value of a regulation comes
along with its social benefit. The specific idea of utilitarianism, though—greatest
happiness of the greatest number—is thereby missed. It is reflected, more or less, solely
in the Efficiency-based justification as it is sketched in supra Part II.C.2.
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how weak or strong the normative premises are that their
normative conception of society entails. This determines which
social function intellectual works are associated with, i.e., what
human needs and goals they are deemed to serve.49
I shall differentiate between three distinct ways in which a
normative conception of society may define how its members
ought to live.50 What is important is whether those conceptions are
merely negative, i.e., setting up minimum boundaries of satisfying
needs, or whether they are positive, i.e., demand the maximum
satisfaction of any need or the satisfaction of certain needs. (1) In
an economic conception of society, it is up to the people to decide
which needs to satisfy and which goals to pursue. This conception
only posits that those factual needs and goals should be satisfied in
a way leading to the maximum overall satisfaction of all society
members. (2) In contrast to the previous conception, by at least
partly deciding what needs and goals are to be pursued, a cultural
conception of society values some needs and goals higher than
others.51 Such a conception consequently integrates not only
factual, but also assumes normative, needs and goals. (3) Finally,
a negative conception of society takes a position between
integrating factual and/or normative needs. It abstains entirely
from demanding either the maximum satisfaction of factually
chosen needs and goals or the satisfaction of certain normative
needs and goals. Instead, it posits that if any human needs or goals
are being satisfied or pursued, some minimum constraints should
be respected. Having introduced three normative conceptions of
society, we can distinguish three types of collectivistic
49

Probably the most well-known example for an existing collectivistic justification
reflects the U.S. Contitution, which reads “Congress shall have power . . . [t]o promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This implies the opinion according to which copyright’s moral basis can
be found in its promotion of social goals; here, progress in science and useful arts.
50
Such theories are commonly referred to as theories of the good (life), the term
Aristotle used in Nicomachean Ethics and other works.
51
This conception also comprises arguments attempting to guarantee merely the
freedom of people, for such a conception normatively presupposes a need for liberty,
whereas the economic conception theoretically can be utilized for a need for restriction of
liberty. This is overlooked by RONALD DWORKIN, Can a Liberal State Support Art?, in A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 221, 229–33 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 1985).
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justifications as well, namely a Constraints-based model, an
Efficiency-based model and a Culture-based model.52 These
justifications answer in a different manner why intellectual works
are needed in society.
1. The Constraints-based Justification of Copyright
The Constraints-based justification stems from a negative
conception of society. According to this approach, copyright is not
justified because it positively promotes the achievement of a
certain ideal of society. This model merely holds a neutral relation
between society and intellectual works, without attributing any
specific need to intellectual works. Rather, copyright is justified
because its existence does not entail any negative consequences for
society. From that, it follows that the moral foundation of
copyright can be traced back to universal constraints of society; by
not violating these constraints, its existence cannot be morally
objectionable. Since copyright, it is argued, abides by these
minimum constraints which govern human action, its legal
implementation is permissible, i.e., morally possible.53 In this
view, copyright is not the result of a constituting, but of a
constraining, principle which is inherent in any reasonable
conception of society. Now, what kind of principle constraining
human action might be generally agreed upon? At this point, it is
quite common to utilize a part of Locke’s property theory.54 This
theory contains the idea of an appropriation limit which can be
found in the so-called sufficiency-proviso.55 According to the
proviso, an appropriation of things is permissible insofar as there is
“enough, and as good left”56 for others. This proviso, then, is
employed to render copyright morally acceptable.57 Needless to
52

For a detailed discussion of these models, see STALLBERG, supra note 18, at 205.
This clearly shows that a Constraints-based Justification leads to a weak justification
of copyright. For if its implementation is merely morally possible, one may just as well
abstain from implementing it. The impact of such an approach confines itself to provide
moral information whether copyright, when existing, is permissible or not.
54
LOCKE, supra note 39, §§ 25–51.
55
See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 175–182 (1974).
56
LOCKE, supra note 39, §§ 27, 33.
57
See, e.g., ADAM D. MOORE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INFORMATION CONTROL:
PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 6–8, 71–119 (2001); Adam D.
53
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say, the Lockean proviso is, more or less, only a particular example
of the more general principle of neminem laedere (no-harm
principle) that can already be found in Roman law.58
2. The Efficiency-based Justification of Copyright
The Efficiency-based justification is arguably the most popular
variant of a collectivistic justification of copyright.59
Notwithstanding differences in detail, one may well summarize
this model in the idea that copyright “can be explained as a means
for promoting efficient allocation of resources.”60 Consequently,
copyright is conceived of as a means to achieve an economically
efficient production and use of the intellectual works it protects.61
To be sure, this thesis needs to be supplemented in order to
become a justification of copyright. Besides demonstrating the
economic rationality of copyright, this finding must also have a
moral dimension. The starting point of this model is the basic
problem of economics. Given scarce resources and infinite human

Moore, Toward a Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
MORAL, LEGAL, AND INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS 81–103 (Adam D. Moore ed., 1997);
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Adam D. Moore, A
Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 77–108 (1997).
58
See JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 1.1, at 36–37 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans.,
Cornell Univ. Press 1987).
59
The number of articles dealing with this approach is permanently increasing; for
examples, see the bibliography in Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS 189, 204–15
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). In addition to numerous articles,
there are also some books devoted to this program; see in particular WENDY J. GORDON &
RICHARD WATT, THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND
ANALYSIS (2003); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2003); RUTH TOWSE, CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE
AND REWARD: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COPYRIGHT AND CULTURE IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (2001); RICHARD WATT, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY: FRIENDS
OR FOES? (2000).
60
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyight Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 325 (1989) (emphasis added).
61
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 308 (1996), separates these aspects. Depending on whether the production or the
use of intellectual works is the focus, Netanel distinguishes an incentive approach and a
neoclassicist approach. See id. In this Article, however, both aspects are equally referred
to as Efficiency-based Justification. See id.
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needs, distribution conflicts inevitably arise. In order to reduce
those conflicts, resources have to be used in a way that achieves a
maximum of satisfaction (allocation efficiency).62
This is
theoretically ensured by the market mechanism. With regard to
copyright, however, a market failure is assumed. That is to say,
despite the demand for intellectual works, the market does not
provide their sufficient production and distribution. The reason is
the free-riding problem of public goods. Since access to
intellectual works is difficult to control, people might hope to use
them free of charge. As a result, consumer demand does not
reflect the real value of intellectual works. Guided by incorrect
market signals, intellectual works are underproduced and/or underdistributed.
Given this situation, the market mechanism
misallocates resources. Copyright, it is argued, rectifies this
market failure. By creating an artificial scarcity through an
exclusive legal right, intellectual works become commodified
products. For this reason, a monetary incentive encouraging the
sufficient production and distribution of intellectual works is
necessary. Moreover, it is assumed that copyright is the most
efficient means able to rectify this market failure.
3. The Culture-based Justification of Copyright
A Culture-based justification is based on a specific cultural
conception of society. Here, intellectual works are endowed with a
special meaning for human well-being; they are considered
indispensable for a culturally valuable society. If this culture is
desirable, then the need for intellectual works is also desirable.
Given that copyright is required as an incentive for the production
of intellectual works, copyright becomes a necessary condition of
that culture. In this way, the moral basis for copyright shifts to
stronger normative premises. It no longer stems from a conception
of society that requires the most efficient satisfaction of contingent
needs. Similarly, minimum constraints of human striving are
irrelevant. Rather, certain needs considered valuable are invoked

62
See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 249 (14th ed.
1992).
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for the justification of copyright. There are a number of ways63 in
which it may be asserted that a lack of intellectual works results in
a “state of cultural stasis.”64 The most popular contemporary way
is the recourse to political culture, namely to democracy. In its
rudimentary form, this approach is indicated in the idea of
copyright as “engine of free expression.”65 Its systematical
elaboration can be found in articles written by Neil Netanel, who
attempts to justify copyright by supposing a necessary connection
between democracy and copyright.66 This does not mean, as one
might be tempted to think, that copyright is considered the
necessary outcome of a democratic process. Instead, Netanel
argues that copyright is a necessary condition of democracy. Thus,
copyright is not conceptualized as a restriction of free expression67
but as its enabling constituent.68 In other words, democracy
depends upon certain flows of communication generated by
copyright in the first place. By connecting this idea with the need
for a democratic society, a moral justification is put forward
distinct of an efficiency perspective.
D. The Problem of Irreconcilability
Now that I have given an account of those justification models
which are widely used, albeit not in the structured and ideal form
presented here, I will turn to their critique. Since I cannot
specifically address here the internal and external flaws of each of
these models,69 I will confine myself to a discussion of the general
63

See, e.g., Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, supra note 17, at 192 (explaining
that the potential possibilities are endless).
64
Barbara Friedman, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural Consequences of
Copyright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157, 158 (1994).
65
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
66
See Netanel, supra note 61; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s
Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217 (1998); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression,
53 VAND. L. REV. 1879 (2000). For a critique on Netanel’s views on copyright and
democracy, see Christopher Yoo, Copyright and Democracy: A Cautionary Note, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2000).
67
See, e.g., Donald Diefenbach, The Constitutional and Moral Justifications for
Copyright, 8 PUB. AFF. Q. 225, 230–34 (1994).
68
Netanel, supra note 44, at 226 n.27.
69
Such a critique can be found in STALLBERG, supra note 18, at 200, 296.
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problem they all face. This problem is a serious and crucial one,
though often overlooked. It is implicitly embodied in the basic
distinction between individualistic and collectivistic models I
developed above. Those people who argue in favor of copyright
find themselves in a situation we may call the problem of
irreconcilability. That is to say, the different moral perspectives
on copyright expressed by the distinction between individualistic
and collectivistic models cannot be reconciled in case of conflict.70
On the contrary, they ultimately make a decision between the
author and society inevitable. To be sure, in such a situation it is
quite popular to seek relief by simply compromising or balancing
the interests involved. However, such an attempt is bound to fail
as long as the models are taken seriously, that is, as long as they
are consistently treated as models of moral justification. This point
will become clear after elucidating different propositions that a
moral justification of copyright might state.
The proposition made by a moral justification of copyright can
vary in two different aspects, namely in its level and its scope. Its
level determines whether a normative proposition applies to either
copyright as an institution or copyright as a content.71 The
institutional level concerns whether the copyright system is
generally justified, independent of its substantive implications. The
content level depends logically upon affirming the prior
institutional level. It deals with the question of how the copyright
system ought to be shaped: under what circumstances what
particular rights are to be granted. Either level can show up with a
different scope of justification, depending upon the deontic modus
the normative standard they correspond to has. The weakest kind
of justification is one according to which copyright (“C”)
corresponds to a moral norm, allowing the legislator to legally
introduce it. Then C is merely morally possible. In contrast, the
strongest justification is where the norm commands the legislative

70
To be sure, as far as there is no conflict between certain individualistic and
collectivistic models, the problem of irreconcilability does not appear. However, this is
very rarely the case.
71
In this context, speaking of copyright as an institution merely refers to its abstract
being as a norm complex, whereas speaking of copyright as a content refers to its
concrete implementation.
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bodies to legally introduce the copyright system. In this case C is
morally necessary. Regarding the institutional justification level,
one of those deontic modi must be given if C is to be justified. The
situation changes when considering the content level. For
example, it is possible that particular rules are forbidden. Thus, it
is conceivable that a moral norm commands the legislator to
institutionally introduce C, and at the same time forbids the
particular content C1. In this case, C is either morally possible or
necessary, but its implementation C1 is morally impossible.
Depending on the modus of the norm, the legislator has to, or is
allowed to, set up copyright. However, he is not allowed to choose
C1 but has to choose different implementations like C2–Cn.
Depending on whether the institution or content of copyright is
allowed, prohibited or even required, one can distinguish between
the moral possibility, moral impossibility and moral necessity of
copyright. In most cases,72 justification models do not merely
claim the moral possibility but even the moral necessity of
copyright.
This is explicitly or implicitly presupposed or
expressed by the justification of a concrete copyright system. The
distinctions drawn here enable us to consider in what respect
compromising or balancing of interests is inadequate. If, for
example, according to an asserted moral norm (N1), an unlimited
subsistence of copyright is morally necessary (C1), whereas,
according to another asserted moral norm (N2), copyright’s
expiration with the death of the author is morally necessary (C2),
then there is an insolvable conflict. For that conflict cannot be
settled by way of compromising, e.g., by determining expiration of
copyright 70 years after the death of the author. On the contrary,
such an outcome would be morally impossible according to N1 and
N2. Cleary then, C1 and C2 by no means can be compromised. A
more fundamental objection supports this view: there is no need
for any balancing of N1 and N2 because there is no normative
conflict at all. This can be seen when thinking of conflicting
norms in general. Is it necessary or possible in such a situation to
balance norms against one another? No, for it is absolutely

72

The only exception is the model, which I refer to as Constraints-based model.

STALLBERG_121307_FINAL

358

12/13/2007 10:02:14 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 18

impossible that some valid norms contradict each other.73 Such a
norm contradiction would not be compatible with the very concept
of normative validity; this concept implies that contradicting norms
cannot be valid at the same time. Thus, in such cases we do not
face a contradiction of norms, but of norm formulations.74 In other
words, we are talking of a semantic, not of a normative
contradiction of N1 and N2. On this semantic level it must be
already clarified which norm formulation prevails and which norm
is therefore taken as being valid.75
III. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: THE UNIVERSALISTICTRANSCENDENTAL APPROACH
In this section, I will present an alternative argument whereby
the shortcomings of both individualistic and collectivistic models
of justifying copyright are partly reduced, if not eliminated. The
suggested argument relies on the insight that the intangible being
of intellectual works is not only their ontological but also their
moral particularity. The ubiquity of intellectual works, in other
words, must not be classified and interpreted as moral weakness—
as is commonly believed76—but, if anything, as their moral
strength, i.e., the reason for the legitimacy of copyright. This
thesis is drawn from the fact that justification models which
originally apply to tangible objects cannot successfully attempt to
justify what is, compared with these objects, morally questionable.
The moral flaws copyright is usually confronted with cannot be
removed by simply ignoring these differences. If copyright ought
to exist at all, the intangible character of intellectual works has to

73
This view is pointed out very well by HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 74–81,
206 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1960).
74
On the distinction between norm and norm formulation see GEORG HENRIK VON
WRIGHT, NORM AND ACTION: A LOGICAL ENQUIRY 93 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1963).
75
This does not apply to value judgments: they need to be balanced against and
compromised with other conflicting values since they do not inform us about their
relation to other values. Obligation judgments, however, do not represent normative
statements to be balanced against others, but are already the result of compromised
values.
76
See supra Part I.
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be recognized and acknowledged as the key to its moral
justification.
Every moral justification of copyright needs to take both the
rationality of individualistic and collectivistic models into account.
A simple combination of those models, however, hardly achieves
that objective. If that were the case then the question of which
primary moral relation prevails in the case of conflict with the
other would be left unanswered. This clearly shows that every
attempt to reconcile those models by a balancing of interest
inevitably fails. If an individualistic model holds it as morally
necessary to implement a right of life long duration in favor of the
author and a collectivistic model considers it morally impossible,
obviously this contradiction cannot be logically resolved. On the
contrary, those models have to be kept separate in order to disclose
the crucial difference one must decide upon; that is, namely
whether to favor the author or society. What we need is a more
fundamental approach whereby both perspectives are, as it were,
deconstructed and freed from their fierce opposition. I will
subsequently refer to this approach as a universalistictranscendental justification. This term means that the proposed
model is neither individualistic nor collectivistic; rather, it can be
conceived as a condition of the possibility of either relation.77
Now the ultimate precondition enabling these relations, i.e., the
prerequisite of the difference they imply, can be found in the
human language.
Thus, the alternative model that will be sketched in this Article
finds its roots in linguistic philosophy. That is to say, conventional
linguistic rules are used to demonstrate the moral plausibility of
copyright. Roughly speaking, this alternative model is built upon
two theoretical ideas. The first idea consists of the assumption that
the performance of human language is a rule-orientated action.

77

See generally C. D. BROAD, KANT. AN INTRODUCTION 13–15 (C. Lewy ed., 1978)
(explaining Kant’s concept of transcendental arguments); SEBASTIAN GARDNER, KANT
AND THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 188–96. (Tim Crane & Jonathan Wolff eds.,
Routledge 1999).
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Stemming from the late Wittgenstein,78 this idea has been
elaborated systematically by the speech act theory as developed by
Austin79 and Searle.80 The second idea refers to the assumption
that those linguistic rules have moral implications as well. Though
more or less already included in the theory of speech acts, that
conclusion was drawn first by the theory of discourse ethics as
developed by Apel,81 Habermas,82 and Alexy.83 Hence, the
following discussion might be conceived of as an attempt to
morally reconstruct copyright by means of speech act theory.
Subsequently, I shall term this program the linguistically moral
reconstruction of copyright. Clearly, the complete elaboration of it
would be an undertaking needing a separate monograph.
Therefore, this Article is restricted in two ways, both in its
theoretical scope and its subject matter. As to its theoretical scope,
only the speech act theory originally developed by Searle is
employed, notwithstanding different versions, alterations or even
criticisms of that theory. Moreover, this theory will be applied
only to a small extract of what can be seen as intellectual works.
The purpose of this paper is not to provide a complete account but
to outline an alternative argument that lies beyond the conflict
between individualistic and collectivistic justifications of
copyright.

78

See, e.g., WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 10, para. 23 (“Here the term ‘language-game’ is
meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an
activity, or of a form of life.”).
79
See generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina
Sbisà eds., Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 1981) (1962).
80
See generally JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE (2d. ed. Press Syndicate of the Univ. of Cambridge 1984) (1969) [hereinafter
SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS].
81
See KARL-OTTO APEL, The A Priori of the Communication Community and the
Foundations of Ethics: The Problem of a Rational Foundation of Ethics in the Scientific
Age, in TOWARDS A TRANSFORMATION OF PHILOSOPHY ch. 7, 225 (Glynn Adey & David
Frisly trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1980) (1972).
82
Its fullest exposition can be found in JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Discourse Ethics: Notes on
a Program of Philosophical Justification, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 43–115 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholson trans.,
MIT Press 1990).
83
See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE THEORY OF
RATIONAL DISCOURSE AS THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 177–208 (Ruth Adler & Neil
MacCormick trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1989).
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My argument will proceed in three parts. In part one, I shall
analyze and explain why and how intellectual works can be
conceived of as complex speech acts. In part two, the results of
that analysis are used to morally reconstruct two aspects of
copyright. On the one hand, the right of attribution of authorship
will be justified by the pattern of incorrect speech act. On the
other hand, the moral justification of exploitation rights is derived
from the nature of language as such. The final part will evaluate
the alternative argument sketched.
A. Intellectual Works as Complex Speech Acts
I contend that intellectual works need to be conceived of as
complex speech acts. For this purpose I will explain three different
theses by which the claim above and its content can be further
developed and completed. The first thesis (a) concerns the
qualification of intellectual works as speech acts in general. I will
show in what respect intellectual works are to be qualified as
institutional facts. Both the second (b) and the third (c) theses rest
on the premise that the speech act designated as an intellectual
work is a complex illocutionary act in the form (F1(p1) & F2(p2)).
The first speech act F1(p1) I will refer to as attributing act, the
second F2(p2) I will refer to as attributed act.84 This distinction
must be clarified in two ways. First, this distinction is merely
analytical so that in fact either act mutually affects and depends
upon the other. Second, the attributed act, as it might be
misunderstood, does not necessarily comprise a single action. In
fact, the act usually consists of several actions so that it is likely to
be a complex illocutionary act. Methodologically, these three
theses rest on the outcome of an ordinary language
phenomenology; I will attempt to reconstruct exactly those rules
with which a speech act corresponds where it produces a symbol
seen as an intellectual work.

84

That act might be termed as attributing object in order to retain the common object
ontology. But then it is overlooked that linguistically not an object—here the sign—but
ultimately a human action behind that sign plays the decisive role.
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1. Intellectual Works as Institutional Facts
I will use the speech act theory to reconstruct the action which
produces the speech act that is being designated and conceived of
as an intellectual work. In so doing the linguistic rules which
allow intellectual works to serve as speech acts can be isolated and
defined. This kind of interpretation presupposes, however, that
intellectual works are to be conceived of as speech acts. This can
be demonstrated by introducing the distinction between brute and
institutional facts as developed and elaborated by Searle.85 While
brute facts describe physically existing entities, institutional facts
comprise those things which exist solely in and by human
language. Intellectual works are a good example of the latter. This
can be illustrated by considering the physical aspect of a painting
or book.86 Such tangible goods do not differ from other man-made
objects such as chairs or screwdrivers. In both cases we are
concerned with physically existing entities that can be labeled as
brute facts. Unless they are destroyed these entities would endure
even if human beings ceased to exist. Of course that does not
mean that brute facts are entirely independent from human
language.87 A chair, for instance, is designated a “chair” merely
because the word “chair” symbolizes that entity. The symbolized
entity itself, however, is not a linguistic phenomenon. Its physical
characteristics exist independently from being symbolized by a
sign.88 Similarly, a painting or a book would not lose its physical
characteristics in a world without language; canvas and oil paint or
ink and sheets of paper would continue to exist.
If a painting or book is qualified as an “intellectual work,” it is
plain that physical characteristics are not being referred to. The
term “intellectual work” does not simply symbolize oil on canvas
85
The distinction between institutional and brute facts can be found in SEARLE, SPEECH
ACTS, supra note 80, at 50–53; JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY
27–29 (The Free Press 1995) [hereinafter SEARLE, SOCIAL REALITY].
86
Of course, the following argumentation does not merely apply to paintings or books
but applies also to all objects that may theoretically be interpreted as intellectual works
(e.g., films, music, sculptures, dances, etc.).
87
SEARLE, SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 85, at 2 (“Of course, in order to state a brute
fact we require the institution of language, but the fact stated needs to be distinguished
from the statement of it.”) (emphasis in original).
88
See, e.g., id. at 27.
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or sheets of paper with ink in the way that the terms “painting” and
“book” do. But what, then, is symbolized by an “intellectual
work”? There is only one answer: If a painting or a book is
designated as an intellectual work then it has to be something
beyond itself. Thus, the notion of “intellectual work” does not
represent physical characteristics, e.g., of paintings or books, but
part of the meaning they symbolize. Such an interpretation,
however, hinges upon a rule attributing to certain physical entities
a certain meaning. Every symbol is based on constitutive rules89
determining under what circumstances something is seen as
something different.90
Consequently, there must be rules
according to which a certain physical sign under certain
circumstances is designated as an intellectual work. Since such
rules can merely exist linguistically91 the possibility of intellectual
works as such depends upon human language.92
2. Intellectual Works as Attributing Acts
My second thesis deals with the first part of the complex
illocutionary act, designated as intellectual work, namely F1(p1). It
says that “intellectual works” are evoked and generated exclusively
by those speech acts, explicitly or implicitly entailing the assertion
of authorship. To put it another way: only those artificial symbols
or signs which point to a human being as their author, i.e.,
containing an attribution, are designated as intellectual works.
That means that the illocutionary role of F1 is an assertion whose
propositional content p1 states that the speech act F2(p2) has one or
several authors. This part of the complex illocutionary act
89

See id. at 27–29 (discussing the concept of a constitutive rule and its difference to the
regulative rule).
90
See id. at 43–46.
91
See id. at 59–66.
92
Since copyright refers to an institutional fact, Niel MacCormick, On the Very Idea of
Intellectual Property: An Essay According to the Institutional Theory of Law, 3 INTELL.
PROP. Q. 227, 234 (2002), has argued that the protection of copyright applies solely to
itself. In other words, copyright protects an artificial object that is created by copyright.
Yet that would be true only if the constitutive rules intellectual works rest upon were
generated by copyright alone. That can be doubted: books, paintings etc. would remain
intellectual works if they were not protected as intellectual works. On the mutual
interdependency between copyright and art see, e.g., Eberhard Ortland & Reinold
Schmücker, Copyright & Art, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1762, 1768–69 (2005).
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“intellectual work” I label as an attributing act. Can we find a
rationale for claiming that the speech act “intellectual work”
necessarily entails such an attributing act?
Stating the contrary would contradict our linguistic
conventions. For propositions like “that is an intellectual work
without an author” or “there are intellectual works without
authors” strike us in the same way as the proposition “that is an
effect without cause” or “there are effects without causes” does.93
The reason for that can be found in a conceptual contradiction:
since the concepts of “author” and “work” as well as the concepts
of “cause” and “effect” mutually affect and presuppose each other,
neither of them can be affirmed or negated without the other. They
represent two related sides of what one is able to conceive of
within the subsisting speech community only as a unity.94
Intellectual works, as a matter of fact, always imply the question:
who is the author? At the same time, therefore, they imply the
theoretical possibility of answering that question.95 If that question
is negated with regard to a subject “intellectual work” then it is
equally denied that that subject is an intellectual work.
It is highly important to stress that the thesis above is a
pragmatic one. That is to say, my thesis refers to dispositive
linguistic conventions. It merely claims that the attribution of
authorship is a linguistically necessary part of performing the
speech act “intellectual work.” It does not claim that this
institutional fact constituted by the speech community is
reasonable or makes any sense. For this reason, any critique
93
To be sure, this does not apply if these assertions are taken to negate merely the
present, not the theoretical existence of an author. Such an interpretation intuitively
removes the otherwise existing conceptual contradiction. Again, it clearly confirms the
conceptual contradiction involved.
94
With regard to the notion of cause/effect it is even possible to claim that it not only
expresses a dispositive convention of speech community—like DAVID HUME, A
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE: BEING AN ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE THE EXPERIMENTAL
METHOD OF REASONING INTO MORAL SUBJECTS 400 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d. ed. 1975)
(1740) did—but represents an a priori necessary concept. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE
OF PURE REASON 218 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., Routledge and Keagan Paul 1963).
95
It seems to me that this aspect is also indicated by MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Origin of
the Work of Art, in BASIC WRITINGS FROM BEING AND TIME (1927) TO THE TASK OF
THINKING (1964) 149 (David Farrell Krell ed., 1977) (“The artist is the origin of the
work. The work is the origin of the artist. Neither is without the other.”).
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calling into question the rationality of such an attribution does not
affect my thesis.96 In addition, the attributing act is necessary but
not sufficient to perform an intellectual work. Someone can
perform an attributing act without evoking an intellectual work,
e.g., by putting his name onto an accidentally found root of a tree.
In order for a speech act to imply the attributing act, the attributed
act itself must fulfill certain requirements. Whether the attributing
act fulfills its purpose, that is, whether it successfully performs the
speech act “intellectual work,” depends after all on the speech act
it attributes. This aspect, however, concerns the second part of the
complex speech act “intellectual work” which will be explained
next.
3. Intellectual Works as Attributed Acts
My third thesis deals with the part of the speech act
“intellectual work” to which I refer to as the attributed act F2(p2).
This act provides the meaningful context within which the act of
attributing can be performed in the first place. In short: F2(p2) is
the condition of its success. It is complicated, however, to
reconstruct the elements of that attributed act F2(p2): how must the
speech act be shaped to automatically imply authorship and
therefore create an intellectual work? Every answer needs, first,
the existence of a congruent linguistic convention, and second, it
must be possible to discover that linguistic practice. It may well be
that—as is the case concerning the concept of art—no consistent
linguistic rule deciding upon when a speech act is an intellectual
work exists. Even if such a convention existed, however, it would
probably not be possible to discover. A solution of this problem is
impossible; but it is also not necessary. This Article can restrict its
reconstruction to elements which represent the core of intellectual
works and can be linguistically explained.

96

See generally Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
“Authorship”, 1999 DUKE L.J. 455 (1991) (presenting a typical critique by the
poststructuralist movement).
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a) Utterance Act and Propositional Content
An analysis of the premises upon which the attributed act
F2(p2) is built, should begin with analyzing its propositional
content p2. Both the utterance act and the propositional act
performed by that speech act need to be examined. The utterance
act is that act generating a sound, sign or symbol. On the other
hand, the propositional act is the expression of a proposition, i.e.,
the composition of a meaningful sign.97 Whether a speech act
represents an intellectual work surely depends upon these two
factors. Three examples help to illustrate this point of view: (i) A
speaker asserts, “it will rain tomorrow”; (ii) a speaker makes that
claim in form of poetry or music; and (iii) a speaker says, “ba be
bi,” meaning that it will rain tomorrow. All examples are based
upon the possibility of being able to perform the same
propositional act by different utterance acts. Still, the question as
to in what case the speech act performed can be considered an
intellectual work might be answered differently. Case (i) is likely
to never be seen as an intellectual work. In contrast, case (ii) may
be interpreted as an intellectual work. Case (iii) might not even be
interpreted as a speech act. The question arises as to why only
case (ii) might be thought of as an intellectual work that implicitly
causes the attributing act.
My response to that question stems from the following
assumption: as soon as the propositional act of the speaker partly
transcends what generally had been or how it specifically had been
previously symbolized, it is interpreted as “intellectual work.” The
concept of intellectual work includes those acts partly eluding the
previous rules of the speech community and, at the same time,
complying with those rules insofar as necessary to retain the
possibility of being designated and interpreted as a speech act. So
the connectivity to the new linguistic rule is maintained implicitly
open by the speaker’s explicit rule breach. This feature may be
termed as the rule-constituting rule breach. That assumption helps
to explain why there are certain speech acts whose comprehension
needs a particular concept and that operate as contextual
97
This linguistic distinction is equivalent to the distinction between idea and
expression in copyright.
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background of the attributing act. If by partially transcending the
linguistically possible, a speech act does not accord with linguistic
convention, then the intended proposition or utterance cannot be
linguistically reproduced other than by connecting it with its
communicator. In the same way, the concept of intellectual work
helps to comprehend what cannot yet adequately be reproduced
linguistically.98
The thesis that intellectual works are—linguistically
speaking—rule-constituting rule breaches also explains the
examples above. In case (i) no rule breach can be recognized,
while case (iii) is a rule breach but without any resemblance of
rule. Only, in case (ii) there is a breach of rules that is able to
generate new rules, partly because of its accordance with previous
rules. This thesis can easily be integrated with considerations
commonly held in art theory. It corresponds to a popular view by
Kant, which contends that art is existentially bound to genius.
According to Kant, genius is “a talent for producing something for
which no determinate rule can be given.”99 This is what Kant calls
originality. This does not mean that the genius lives and creates
beyond any rule. There is also original nonsense100—which can be
defined as a rule-less rule breach. The genuine or meaningful
originality—which will always be capable of meaningful
interpretation—must refer to the rules that enable it to be original
in the first place. For “directing the work to a purpose requires
determinate rules that one is not permitted to renounce.”101 A
work that is at once rule breaching and rule constituting has,
according to Kant’s terminology, spirit. It consists of expressing
“what is ineffable in the mental state accompanying a certain
presentation and to make it universally communicable—whether
the expression consists in language or painting or plastic art.”102
This requires uniting the ineffable “in a concept that can be
98

If the thesis of the rule-constituting rule breach was true, it could explain why the
length of copyright is restricted. For after a certain time it is possible to integrate the
speech act of intellectual works linguistically.
99
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 175 (Werner S. Pluhar trans., Hackett
Publ’g. Co. 1987) (1790).
100
Cf. id. at 175 (stating that “nonsense too can be original”).
101
Id. at 178.
102
Id. at 186.
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communicated without the constraint of rules (a concept that on
that very account is original, while at the same time it reveals a
new rule that could not have been inferred from any earlier
principles or examples).”103 This sort of interpretation supports the
paradigm of a rule-constituting rule breach according to which
originality must not be conceived of as monological but
dialogical.104
b) The Illocutionary Act
Compared with the preceding analysis, the determination of the
illocutionary force F2 which the attributed act must meet in order
to be designated as intellectual work is quite simple. While this act
cannot be restricted, as in the case of the attributing act, to a certain
illocutionary force, its force can be systematized by means of a
taxonomy of speech acts, as developed by Searle. Searle
differentiates five kinds of illocutionary acts, namely assertives,
directives, commissives, expressives and declarations.105
Assertives are those illocutionary acts expressing that some state is
the case, such as assertions, claims, descriptions, confirmations,
informing, etc.106 In other words, a proposition is purported to be
true. Directives aim at attempting to make someone take a certain
action, such as pledging, commanding, requesting, recommending,
etc.107 In the case of commissives the speaker commits himself to
a certain behavior. Good examples are a promise, a threat, a
guarantee, an agreement, etc.108 Expressives are those speech acts
with which a speaker tries to express a psychological state which
points towards a propositional content. To this apologizing,
Finally,
thanking, mourning, appreciating, etc. belong.109

103

Id.
The advantage of a dialogical interpretation of originality is also emphasized by
Friedman, supra note 64, at 179.
105
See Searle, A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts, in EXPRESSION AND MEANING. STUDIES
IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS 1, 12–20 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1979); JOHN R. SEARLE
& DANIEL VANDERVEKEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC 52 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1985).
106
See, e.g., SEARLE & VANDERVEKEN, supra note 105, at 182–92.
107
See, e.g., id. at 198–205.
108
See, e.g., id. at 192–98.
109
See, e.g., id. at 211–16.
104
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declarations represent those cases where the illocutionary act
brings about a correspondence of reality with a propositional
content, such as cursing, nominating, baptizing, etc.110
All those categories can be derived from the possible relations
between language and the world. Every speech act necessarily
relates its propositional content in a certain way to the world. The
way this relation occurs depends upon the direction of fit between
the propositional content and the world. There are four possible
directions:111 First, it is possible that the propositional content
aims at matching a status of the world (word-to-world-direction).
This direction is employed by the assertives. Secondly, the
converse is possible, that is, the world is supposed to match the
propositional content (world-to-word-direction). That occurs in
the case of directives and commissives. Thirdly, both directions
can be combined; then the world is supposed to match the
propositional content by presenting it as having changed
simultaneously (double-direction). This happens in the case of
declarations. Fourthly, there is the possibility of no direction at all,
when a direction is presupposed by an utterance (empty-direction).
These are the expressives.
Thus, the illocutionary force, F2 (being necessary for the
occurrence of an intellectual work), depends upon the direction of
fit between its propositional content and the world. Like the
reconstruction of the propositional content itself, however, it is not
possible to fully determine which direction is linguistically
presupposed concerning intellectual works. At this point, it is
therefore assumed that speech acts at least are considered
intellectual works if their direction matches those of assertives and
directives.112 This assumption not only rests upon the fact that it is
quite common in the field of art theory to comprehend art as a
description of reality—like the Platonic or Aristotelian view of
mimesis—or as changing the world. It rests equally upon the fact
that the direction of commissives, expressives and declarations can
110

See, e.g., id. at 205–11.
See id. at 52–53.
112
That does not mean, to be sure, that a complex speech act seen as an intellectual
work cannot perform other directions of fit as well. Yet it does mean that this aspect is
not constitutive for its being an intellectual work.
111
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hardly be asserted as typical for intellectual works. Rarely will
someone believe that a speech act is an intellectual work because
its speaker tries to commit himself to an action. The same applies
to declarations: a speech act is never deemed to be an intellectual
work because it performs a baptism, etc. Regarding expressives,
the situation seems to be less plain. Isn’t it a characteristic of
intellectual works that they express approval or regret? However,
such a view is only plausible if those expressions are connected
with a critical attitude. In order to maintain the theoretical
difference to directives, those expressions can only represent the
uncritical utterance of regret or approval. Anything else would
lead to a world-to-word-direction which resulted in directives.
B. The Linguistically Moral Reconstruction of Copyright
So far I have outlined how intellectual works can be analyzed
and defined by utilizing the speech act theory. I have attempted to
show how the institutional fact “intellectual work” can be grasped
by means of ordinary language phenomenology. I will now
demonstrate how a different institutional fact, namely the
copyright system, is morally justified. First, the preceding
linguistic analysis must be embedded into a moral argument with
which the legal right concerning those speech acts can be made
plausible. In order to accomplish this, I shall employ two different
strategies by which that objective can be pursued.113 On the one
hand, it is generally possible to examine whether actions usually
seen as infringements of copyright offend linguistic conventions.
Such offences, then, can be proven morally wrong by applying the
argumentative figure of defective speech act, normatively
underpinned by Kantian universalism. On the other hand, it is
equally possible to focus not on the defects the speech act
performed by a copyright infringer entails but on the linguistic
necessity of those speech acts designated as “intellectual works.”
113
These strategies are not the only ones conceivable. The fact, for example, that
intellectual works are to be qualified as speech acts already entails moral implications,.for
it enables us without difficulty to explain why animals or natural phenomena could never
produce intellectual works. A speech act is by its very concept an action performed by a
member of our speech community according to its rules. Those members are solely
human beings.
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By assuming an inherent telos of language promoted by
intellectual works, copyright can be morally justified as long as it
is considered a necessary condition for the creation and
dissemination of those works. The first strategy (a) will be
demonstrated with regard to the right of attribution of authorship
and bears centrally on the defects the act of plagiarism has
according to speech act theory. The second strategy (b) will be
demonstrated with regard to exploitation rights. Starting from a
certain nature of language—reproduction and alteration of the
world—it will be shown that this nature relies upon the existence
of intellectual works.
1. Justifying a Right of Attribution of Authorship: The Act of
Plagiarism
The following justification of the right of attribution of
authorship consists of two argumentative parts. In the first part
(aa), the act of plagiarism will be linguistically reconstructed to
illustrate the speech act performed by somebody who plagiarizes
an intellectual work. In the course of this analysis, it will be seen
that the attributing act performed by a plagiarist must be qualified
as a defective speech act in two ways. In a second part (bb), an
argument is given which lends moral weight to these linguistic
defects. At this point, I will employ a certain interpretation of the
categorical imperative as developed by Kant.
a) The Linguistic Defectiveness of Plagiarism
In order to demonstrate the value of my approach and illustrate
the idea of a defective speech act, I will examine the act of
plagiarism. Usually a plagiarist is someone who intentionally
portrays himself as the author of an intellectual work which he has
not created. Such behavior is widely considered unethical. From
the perspective of speech act theory, however, plagiarism is prima
facie very similar to the speech act analyzed as an intellectual
work.114 By claiming authorship of the speech act in question,
plagiarism equally comprises two speech acts: the attributing and
the attributed act. How, then, can it be argued linguistically that it
114

See supra Part III.I.A.(a).
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is rational to consider the plagiarist as an immoral agent? The
answer can only be found by a subtle analysis of what the
plagiarist’s claim of authorship must imply and express
pragmatically in order to succeed.
What we need is a
reconstruction of the act of plagiarism in terms of speech act
theory. In doing so it will become apparent that the attributing act
F1(p1) is subject to certain conditions offended by the plagiarist.
First, the performance of F1(p1) is subject to preparatory
conditions originating in the propositional content p1 and the act of
assertion F1. The claim that the plagiarist is an author works if,
and only if, there is a linguistic rule according to which someone
can be deemed to be an author at all. In other words, at the outset
it is to be presupposed that authorship as an institutional fact does
exist. Without authorship there cannot be plagiarism and vice
versa. For that reason p1 is internally connected with the premise
of authorship. Hence, by claiming his authorship the plagiarist
implicitly asserts that he who is the author is to be treated as
author.115 But if F1(p1) always contrafactually presupposes that the
author must be acknowledged, the plagiarist faces a serious
dilemma. On the one hand, his attributing act makes sense only
when presupposing that the author obtains recognition as an
author. On the other hand, the plagiarist cannot hold that premise
since he wants recognition as the true author even though he is not.
Ultimately, this would result in the absurd claim “I am the author
of that intellectual work but I deny the existence of authorship.”
Not only is this speech act defective; it also is not successful. A
plagiarist thus will want to avoid that consequence by concealing
the fact of his non-authorship. As a result, he is bound to perform
the assumptions of F1(p1) in a contrafactual rather than in a factual
way. In that case, it is true, that the speech act of plagiarist is
defective but at least successful. According to Austin we are
merely confronted with an insincerity rendering a speech act
“unhappy.”116
In addition, there is still a second defect that can be found in
such a case. For the performance of F1(p1) is subject to certain
115

Authorship cannot mean recognizing someone who pretends to be author. For the
plagiarist implicitly claims to be recognized as author and not as plagiarist.
116
AUSTIN, supra note 79, at 39.
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conditions of sincerity. These conditions are not morally based but
simply spring from the illocutionary force of the assertion F1.
Every assertion necessarily expresses the speaker’s belief in the
truth of the proposition he wants to assert.117 For it is plainly
impossible to simultaneously perform an assertion and deny its
truth, because the contradiction this entails would prevent such
utterances from being understood and interpreted as an assertion at
all. Thus, if the speech act of assertion is to be performed
successfully, the psychological state of sincerity inevitably must be
expressed. In the case of plagiarism, however, the plagiarist does
not believe in the truth of his assertion. Otherwise he would not be
a plagiarist but at the most someone who performs unconsciously a
defective attributing act. In order to avoid the failure of his
assertion, every plagiarist is bound to conceal that belief. By
performing F1(p1) instead, he will express a contrafactually
psychological state he does not factually have. As a result, his
speech act certainly remains defective but at the same time is
successful.
b) The Moral Implications of Defective Speech Acts
The speech act performed by a plagiarist is successful but
defective for two reasons. First, the speech act offends a
preparatory condition by implying something which the plagiarist,
by definition, cannot presuppose. Second, the plagiarist breaches a
condition of sincerity as he expresses a psychological state he
cannot have as a plagiarist. In order to use these aspects to claim
that plagiarism is to be prohibited and a right of attribution is
morally necessary, the moral relevance of those defects must be
demonstrated. But how is that possible? One might be inclined to
consult the figure of performative contradiction as it has become
The label “performative
popular in discourse ethics.118
117

See SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS, supra note 80, at 64.
See Robert Alexy, Discourse Theory and Human Rights, 9 RATIO JURIS 209, 214
(1996) (using that figure); HABERMAS, supra note 82, at 80–81, 89–109. Using that
figure, though, has been massively criticized. See, e.g., ARMIN ENGLÄNDER, DISKURS ALS
RECHTSQUELLE? ZUR KRITIK DER DISKURSTHEORIE DES RECHTS 42–47 (Mohr Siebeck
2002); PETER VON GRIL, DIE MÖGLICHKEIT PRAKTISCHER ERKENNTNIS AUS SICHT DER
DISKURSTHEORIE. EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUR JÜRGEN HABERMAS UND ROBERT ALEXY 53–
56 (Duncker & Humbolt 1998). However, the critique does only apply to its tautological
118
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contradiction” refers to a contradiction between the content of an
act and the necessary presuppositions of its performance. The
speech act, for example, “I claim authorship but I do not believe in
my assertion” clearly is a pragmatic contradiction that leads to its
failure. For every assertion needs to express belief in its truth in
order to be understood by others as an assertion.119 However, this
argument does not take us very far. First, the moral relevance of
its reasoning can be questioned: if the contradiction itself already
results in the speech act being not only defective but fails as well,
it is absurd to prohibit its success. Second, the speech act of
plagiarism does not represent a performative contradiction, that is,
a contradiction in performing an action. Since that speech act
perfectly implies and expresses its necessary conditions it is
externally consistent and therefore successful.
Thus, the contradiction entailed by plagiarism points at a
different dimension, at the dimension of will. By performing the
speech act of plagiarism the plagiarist shows that he accepts the
preparatory conditions and conditions of sincerity upon which his
practice linguistically relies.120 This is exactly the reason why he
fakes their existence. So he clearly knows that the performance of
his speech act necessitates two things. First, it necessitates the
existence of the institution of authorship without which the
asserted propositional content p1 would not make any sense.
Second, it necessitates the belief in the sincerity of the content
without which the assertion F1 would not be possible. To
guarantee the success of his speech act, therefore, the plagiarist
must will both the institution of authorship, as well as the belief in
its sincerity, to exist. Yet the plagiarist cannot intend for his
speech act to become a common practice because he would no
longer be able to perform it. The impossibility of wanting the
action as a general rule without causing its impossibility represents
the inherent contradiction of plagiarism. This contradiction

use as a means of justifying rules on whose basis a performative contradiction rests. It
does not apply insofar as those rules are already given. In such a case, even critics admit
that a performative contradiction is a compelling argument. See, e.g., ERNST TUGENDHAT,
VORLESUNGEN ÜBER ETHIK 166–68 (Surhkamp 1993).
119
See SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS, supra note 80, at 64–65.
120
Id. at 62 (analyzing argumentation of insincere promises).
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consequently leads to the accusation of a necessary inconsistency
that is implied by his conduct and makes it morally wrong.
The stated argument, ultimately, is a Kantian one. It illustrates
that version of the categorical imperative according to which one
ought to act on a maxim which one can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law.121 Hence, my argument rests on a
compelling principle, namely the principle of universalization or
impartiality respectively. That principle is a minimum requirement
on all moral judgments.122 Every action will be generally agreed
upon only if that action can also be generally realized. So the
proposed argument also proves that the categorical imperative is
not a completely meaningless principle as critics often claim.123 Its
weakness merely lies in the fact that it only works as long as
linguistic rules exist enabling both the institution of authorship and
the speech act of assertion. For “a contradiction,” as Hegel argued,
“must be a contradiction of something, i.e., of some content
presupposed from the start as a fixed principle.”124 Admittedly, the
argument I present is not able to provide grounds for such a fixed
principle. More precisely, it is not able to establish those linguistic
rules which the act of plagiarism contradicts. As a result, the
possibility of its application relies upon contingently linguistic
rules whose subsistence it cannot ensure. Still, this does not point
to any defect with my rationale. For in any event, the speech act of
plagiarism cannot be performed successfully unless those linguistic
rules allowing meeting its necessary conditions do already exist.
Once again, without authorship there is no plagiarism. Hence,
inasmuch as that speech act can come into existence, it can also be
discredited as being immoral. From that it follows that the right of
attribution of authorship is morally necessary.125

121

See KANT, supra note 21, 31–32. On this formula, see Christine M. Korsgaard,
Kant’s Formula of Universal Law, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 77 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996).
122
J. L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 83 (Pelican Books 1977) (“This
principle, in some sense, is beyond dispute.”).
123
See HEGEL, supra note 43, para. 135, for a classical critique.
124
Id.
125
That applies only insofar as the institution of authorship does exist. Otherwise, the
question for rights of the author could not be put forward.
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2. Justifying Exploitation Rights: The Telos of Language
Justifying exploitation rights by means of speech act theory is
much more complicated. Since the exploitation of an intellectual
work does not affect its attributing and attributed act, such a
justification cannot be undertaken by simply proving it
linguistically defective. For this reason, I shall suggest a different
argument. I will attempt to explain that those speech acts
designated as intellectual works are linguistically necessary.
Assuming also that exploitation rights are required for facilitating
the factual performance of those speech acts, these rights are
therefore morally necessary. In what follows this argument will be
further elaborated. As a first step in section (a), the idea behind it
will be given a shape in a four-stage argument. Subsequently in
section (b), two problems with that argument will be discussed.
a) The Structure of a Teleological Argument
How can it linguistically be shown that exploitation rights are
morally reasonable? My answer consists of a four-stage argument:
(i) The first stage focuses on the attributed act and the
characteristics of its propositional content.
As discussed
previously intellectual works can be conceived of as ruleconstituting rule breaches. They form speech acts that enhance
and expand the possibility of what can be linguistically expressed.
Intellectual works consequently result in an increase of linguistic
possibilities. (ii) The second stage has two aspects, both of which
emphasize the necessity of such an increase. First, a certain nature
or telos of language is presupposed. That is to say, human
language aims at reproducing or altering the concept of world.
Second, the concept of world is not static but dynamic. As the
world permanently changes, new perspectives and interpretations
(both of descriptive and normative kind) emerge. In order to
integrate them linguistically, language must differentiate further.
(iii) At the third stage two premises are asserted. First, the
performance of those speech acts designated as intellectual works
does not result from nature but, rather, requires incentives.
Second, these incentives can only be given by exploitation rights.
(iv) The fourth stage consists of the conclusion that exploitation
rights are morally necessary.
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b) Defending its Assumptions
Since the first stage of the argument has been developed in the
course of section III.A. I will focus on stages (B) and (C). The
second stage introduces the thesis that the nature or telos of
language involves reproducing and altering the world. Does that
thesis make any sense? The assertion that there is an inherent telos
in language is not new. In fact, it is found in the work of
Habermas, though in a somewhat different way. He holds
language as a place of rationality; according to him language
embodies the telos of understanding.126 Such a normative thesis
can easily be criticized, e.g., by observing that language is also
used to produce dissent.127 In this Article the notion of “telos”
shall mean something different. It does not deal with the objective
language ought to pursue but with the objective language is
necessarily directed towards. This interpretation is supported by
Searle’s argument regarding the world-direction of language.
Language can be directed at the world or the world can be directed
at language.128 The former refers to reproducing the world, the
latter points at an alteration of the world. Thus, it is reasonable to
assume that at least one purpose language has can be found in its
effects. It can be said, then, that the telos of language also
comprises the reproduction and alteration of the world. Due to the
permanent alteration of the world, however, its linguistic
interpretation and description must alter as well.
Difficulties with my argument can be found at its third stage.
They are identical to those problems arising from the so-called
incentive function of copyright. Particularly, the argument
126

See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, The Theory of Communicative Action, 1 REASON AND
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 287 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984)
(1981) (“Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech.”); JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF
LAW AND DEMOCRACY 4 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996).
127
For a critique, see Niklas Luhmann, Was ist Kommunikation?, in AUFSÄTZE UND
REDEN 103 (Oliver Jahraus ed., 2001) (“One can also communicate in order to mark a
dissent, and there is no compelling ground upon which the search for consent should be
considered more rational than the search for dissent.”) (author’s translation).
128
To be sure, both directions can be combined. Since the analysis of the speech act
intellectual works perform examined only these directions, I confine myself to discuss
only these.

THE
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assumes that those linguistically expanding and enhancing speech
acts called intellectual works do need an incentive in the first
place; in terms of the efficiency-based model, that premise is
identical to assuming a market failure concerning intellectual
works. In addition, the required incentive can only be obtained by
creating exploitation rights concerning those works. Thus, these
rights are merely servants of a linguistic necessity. Of course, the
plausibility of my argument does depend on the empirical validity
of the incentive function thesis, which in any event cannot be
proven empirically. But is the given argument, then, equally
defective? Not at all. Unlike the Efficiency-based and Culturebased justification my argument does not argue collectivistically
by referring to social needs but it does relocate those problems at
the place intellectual works emanate from, i.e., human language.
C. Evaluation of the Alternative Model
Several objections to the linguistic reasoning for a right of
attribution of authorship and for exploitation rights are
conceivable. It is possible, for example, that the normative basis of
the alternative model sketched might be criticized. For it is true
that the claim that from linguistic defects and necessities normative
rules can be inferred, cannot itself be justified by linguistic rules.
Thus, the model ultimately infers norms from facts, at least
psychologically. Yet that defect is inherent in any normative
argument and therefore is shared by the other justification models.
All justification models must begin with an unproven premise
upon which their argument rests. So that objection is not specific
to my argument but concerns the ability to justify moral norms in
general. Since the justifiability of moral norms must be assumed
in order to be able to discuss the morality of copyright at all, that
objection has a fatal connotation. In discourses about the moral
justification of copyright, the explicit negation of the truth ability
of normative statements results in a performative contradiction.
This is so because this negation explicitly denies what the assertion
“copyright is justified or not justified” implicitly presupposes.
This Article would face the same problem if it denied the truth
ability of normative statements but, at the same time, discussed
arguments for and against the justification of copyright. So the
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language game or practice with which participants engage when
addressing the morality of copyright inevitably assumes that moral
norms are theoretically justifiable.129
However, the aforementioned objection makes us think about
another possible criticism: What is the advantage of the alternative
model if it has the same (theoretical) weaknesses as the others?
The universalistic-transcendental model sketched in this Article
represents a progress in two respects. First, it avoids a normative
deficiency embodied in the other models, and second, it is more
specific than those models. A normative deficiency is sorted out
by overcoming the fierce conflict between individualistic and
collectivistic models. In contrast, the alternative model goes back
to the initial link between either position, namely their coexistence
in the speech community. So a right of attribution of authorship is
no longer justified by claiming a moral relation either between
author/work or society/work; it is justified because in either
relation the speech act of plagiarism is equally defective according
to conventional linguistic rules. Similarly, exploitation rights are
necessary due to the function of language which is in either
relation necessarily identical.130 Moreover, my model is more
specific as it takes into account the ontology of intellectual works
in a more appropriate way. Not only does it argumentatively
integrate the ontology of intellectual works like Work-based and
Culture-based models, it also considers human language as the
central argument for a moral justification of copyright at all.

129

It needs to be emphasized, however, that this is the only function of that assumption;
in particular, it does not mean that moral norms are objectively justifiable.
130
One might ask whether there is any difference to the collectivistic justification. For
it could seem that, by referring to human language, my approach is ultimately subject to
societal interests. In other words: Does not language itself always concern the interest of
any society? Yet this “interest” differs significantly from those interests underlying
collectivistic justifications. First, language is the means by which we—authors and
society —give expression to our interests. Thus, it is the prior condition for our ability to
express the interests forming the basis for collectivistic justifications. Secondly, the
function of language lies not at our disposal but is rather the evolutionary product of
unintended events.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Why is copyright morally justified? This question is normally
answered in two opposing ways. In the European-Continental
context it is mostly held that a specific relation between authors
and their intellectual works exists giving copyright as a legal
institution moral relevance. In this way, copyright is based upon a
moral right of the author which bestows upon him an entitlement
to his intellectual works. This kind of justification which can be
designated as individualistic is opposed by a perspective
dominating the Anglo-American area. It holds that the moral
justification of copyright results from a specific relation between
society and intellectual works. Thus, copyright is morally
grounded in a way which can be referred to as collectivistic. The
crucial difference between these standpoints can be put in another
way: According to the individualistic perspective, the author’s
legal right—that is the copyright—is also his moral right. Hence
the moral and legal relations coincide.
By contrast, the
collectivistic perspective takes copyright solely as the author’s
legal, not as his moral right. So the moral and legal relation part
company with one another. To be sure, the difference as
formulated above does not overlook that intellectual works concern
interests of both society and authors. It decides, however, upon the
ultimate moral justification of copyright, i.e., which relation
prevails in case of conflict. In such a situation, any attempt to
settle the issue by balancing or compromising the interests
involved is bound to fail. Because of what I have called the
problem of irreconcilability, in the light of those models a decision
between author and society is inevitable.
One possible solution is the alternative model which I have
sketched in this Article. This approach can be conceived of as an
universalistic-transcendental justification.
It is universalistic
because it is neither individualistic nor collectivistic but originates
from a level prior to that difference. It is transcendental because
that prior level is found in the ultimate precondition enabling those
relations, i.e., the condition of the possibility of either relation.
This condition is the human language. Starting with this premise,
it is possible to demonstrate that intellectual works are to be
construed as speech acts. This finding, in turn, can be used to
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morally reconstruct certain features of copyright. On the one hand,
the right of attribution of authorship can be justified by elucidating
the linguistic defects attached to the act of plagiarism. On the
other hand, the moral justification of economic rights derives from
the nature of language as such, for this nature relies upon the
existence of intellectual works. The outlined argument advances
common perspectives on copyright law in two ways.
Ontologically, the traditional way in copyright law of thinking of
intangible objects is abandoned in favor of thinking of
communicative actions. Intellectual works should no longer be
seen as objects but as the meaning of speech acts performed by
authors. Morally, the argument overcomes the thinking of
individualistic and collectivistic relations in favor of thinking of
linguistic conventions. Thus, copyright should not be derived from
moral rights of authors or of society but from human language as
their common form of being. If the proposed ontological and
moral paradigm shift were encouraged by this Article, if the
traditional thinking were abandoned in favor of thinking of
communicative actions and its rules, much would be achieved.

